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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Due Process - Substituted Service
on Nonresident Motorist's Liability Insurance Carrier. - The plain-
tiff, a Texas resident, was injured in a collision in Louisiana
while a passenger in an automobile owned by the driver, an Okla-
homa resident. The action was brought under the direct action
statute in the Louisiana state court directly against the driver's
liability insurer, an Oklahoma corporation which had not transacted
any business in the State. [LSA-R.S. 22:665 "this right of direct
action shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was
written or delivered in . . . Louisiana or not and whether or not
such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, pro-
vided the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana."
LSA-R.S. 13:3475 provides for service of process on the nonresident
or his insurer.) When the action was removed to the federal district
court, the defendant insurer averred that the statute which allowed
a direct action to be brought against foreign insurers was a violation
of due process guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. Defendant
moved to quash the service and dismiss the action. HELD: motion
denied. The Louisiana legislature has the right to provide a forum
through substituted service for a suit against a nonresident insurer,
even though the insurer's only contact with the state was its "presence
on the risk" when the accident occurred. Puigh v. Oklahoma Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 155 (E. D. La. 1958).
The direct action statute in the case at bar allows an injured party
to bring an action against the insurer of a tort-feasor directly, joining
the insurer and the tort-feasor, or an action against the insurer in
lieu of the tort-feasor. The doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 (1878), which states that ". . . no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property [from] without
its territory" has caused great controversy to arise as to where the
line of limitation on extra-territorial service of process should be
drawn, particularly with respect to foreign corporations. Unquestion-
ably the inroads into the doctrine have been caused by the advent
of modern communication; more particularly the automobile. Olberd-
ing v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 346 U. S. 338, 341 (1953). It is well
established that a judgment in personam rendered against a nonresi-
dent who bad not been served with process nor appeared in the suit
is without validity. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917) ; Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 246 (1958). Due process of law is
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denied by the action of a state court in according full faith and credit
to a judgment in personam rendered by a court of a sister state
against a nonresident who was not personally served with a sum-
mons within the state, and who made no appearance in the action.
Old Wayne Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8
(1907); distinguished, Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U. S. 643, 653 (1950). But in the McDonough case, supra, no
notice of this summons was given by the insurance commissioner to
the defendant. The judicial trend began to turn when Justice
Brandeis said that nonresident motorists are not denied their consti-
tutional rights by the requirement of a New Jersey statute which
made them appoint the secretary of state of New Jersey as their
agent upon whom process could be served in any legal proceed-
ing caused by the operation of their automobile within the state. Kane
v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916) ; Boinze v. Nordis Sportswear,
Inc., 165 F. 2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1948). It was firmly established
that a state could declare the use of its highways as equivalent to
the appointment by the nonresident of a state officer as agent for
service of process, while allowing for continuances to give the non-
resident a reasonable time and opportunity to defend himself. The
Court declared this a valid exercise of state police power. Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 356, 357 (1927). The court reaffirmed
this in Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928), by saying that the
statute must contain a provision making it reasonably probable that
the notice will be communicated to the person being sued. Explained,
Griffin v. Ensign, 15 F. R. D. 200, 203 (M. D. Pa. 1953). The
qualitative requirements were outlined a little more clearly when
the Court said that ". . . a defendant to a judgment in personam
. . . [must] have certain minimum contacts with . . . [the state]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " International Shoe Ca.
v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945). The boundary lines
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. Id., 326 U. S. 310,
318. In Lumnberian's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U. S. 48
(1954) ; followed, Collins v. Amer. Auto Insurance Co., 239 F. 2d
416, 418 (2nd Cir. 1956), the Court said that an insurer in an action
under the direct action statute is not merely a nominal defendant,
but the real party in interest, and that due process is not violated by
a state statute compelling a foreign liability insurer, as a condition
to doing business in the state, to consent to a direct action being
brought against the insurer for injury occurring within the state.
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954);
[Vol. ii
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reh. denied, 348 U. S. 921 (1955). It has been long recognized that
states may seize local activities which are part of multi-state trans-
actions and regulate them to protect the interests of their own people.
Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53 (1940); Hoopeston Canning Co. v.
Cullen, 318 U. S. 313 (1943) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 (1935). Even though a liability
insurance policy containing a no action clause is valid under the
law of the place where the policy was issued, due process is not
violated by a state statute which gives the injured person the right
of direct action against the insurer before the final determination of
the insured's obligation to pay. Watson case, supra. "Louisiana
has a constitutional right to subject foreign liability insurance com-
panies to the direct action provision of its laws whether they consent
or not." Id., 348 U. S. 66, 74. In the Watson case, supra, after stat-
ing the decisions relied on by the defendant, e.g. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143 (1934),
the Court pointed out that situations might arise wherein the state's
interest was so important that it could justify non-enforcement of
a contract made outside its jurisdiction. The interest of Louisiana
in taking care of its people injured within the state was determined
to be of this type. Similarly, it had an interest in policies of insur-
ance. The interests of the state wherein the contract was made
cannot outweigh the interest of Louisiana in taking care of those
injured therein. Id., 348 U. S. 66. Air. Justice Black in McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 335 U. S. 220 (1957), a California case
in which the policy in dispute was the insurer's only connection with
the forum, stated that it was ". . . sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with the state." Similar circumstances and accord, Ross v.
Amer. Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S. C. 433, 102 S. E. 2d 743 (1958).
In the instant case, Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co.,
supra, District Judge Wright held that "[i] t is the nature and quality
of the contact, and the interest of the state therein which is determi-
nate. . . . Since the accident within the state is sufficient contact to
justify maintenance of the suit for damages against the nonresident
motorist, it would seem that the same accident should justify the
maintenance of suit against his nonresident liability insurer who,
after all, is the real party in interest."
As the cases clearly indicate, the constitutionality of the direct
action statute is established. An extension of the principles of sub-
stituted service statutes can not help but lead to direct action statutes.
Sociological contact has been declared sufficient to satisfy due pro-
1959]
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cess against the defense of full faith and credit to contractual rights
arising in other states. This case, like many others, further whittles
down the once revered doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff. The attempt is
successful because of the flexibility of the meaning given due pro-
cess. The considerations which moved the court in 1878 (notice,
adequate opportunity to defend, and a guarantee of a fair trial) are
no longer dependent on physical presence within the jurisdiction.
The considerations which move today's courts are a sensible appli-
cation of the doctrine forum non conveniens and certain minimal
contacts which give the state a legitimate interest in the action.
The automobile and its attendant good and evil has wrought this
doctrinal change. It is possible that these exceptions have gone so
far as to obviate the rule; leaving only exceptional cases for its appli-
cation. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 (1958). The courts
will apparently hold, when a party is a real party in interest who has
had adequate and proper notice, with sufficient time to prepare a
defense, who is not greatly inconvenienced in traveling to the forum,
and who receives substantial justice, that said party shall not have
been deprived of due process of law, if there is strict compliance with
the statute. The instant situation would not arise in South Carolina
as there is no statute which makes possible direct action against
foreign liability insurers. As it stands today, the South Carolina
substituted service statute, CODE Or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952,
§ 46-104, provides for an effective substituted service. With a direct
action statute substantially like Louisiana's, South Carolina would be
affording much more protection to those injured and killed on its
roads and highways. This apparent disregard of contractual rights
arising in sister states is nothing new to our federal system, which
is flexible, and which must remain so if it is to live. The direct
action statute is another step forward in helping to solve the per-
plexing problems brought about by the automobile. Intelligently
applied, this statute would help to advance the cause of those who
unfortunately have met tragedy on the highway.
ELLIS I. KAIN.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- Illegal Search and Seizure -Ad-
inissibility of Evidence Obtained Thereby. - The defendants were
arrested in a raid upon a nudist camp pursuant to a warrant against
other inhabitants of the camp. While purportedly on business at
the camp, the two policemen who took out the warrants had witness-
ed violations of the Indecent and Open Exposure Statute of Michi-
[Vol. ii
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gan. Over two weeks later the police returned, ostensibly to serve
these warrants. They found that "bigger game" was "in the net".
Within less than two minutes after a radio call by the two "shocked"
officers, three carloads of policemen, conveniently cruising in the
neighborhood, arrived on the scene. The defendants were herded
before "clicking cameras" like "plucked chickens", hauled away in
police cars, and questioned for over five hours. In a criminal action,
the defendants were convicted of violations of C. L. S. 730.355a, the
indecent exposure statute of Michigan. HELD: In a 4-3 decision,
the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the convictions on the
grounds that the search and seizure was illegal. People v. Hilda-
bridle, 353 Mich. 562, 92 N. W. 2d 6 (1958).
It is of the essence of a free government that the individual shall
be secure in his person, his home, and his property from unlawful
invasion, from unlawful search, from unlawful seizure. People v.
Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 557, 3 A. L. R. 1505 (1919);
Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F. 2d 690 (D. C. Cir. 1940).
In order to achieve this security, it is necessary that no officer should
obtain entry upon another's premises by force or by an illegal threat.
The prohibition of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion is against all unreasonable searches and seizures. Gouled v.
United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Weeks z. United States, 232
U. S. 383 (1914). However, the federal rule which excludes evi-
dence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is not im-
posed on the states as a requirement of due process. Wolf v. Colora-
do, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) ; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
Many state courts, including South Carolina's, prefer to admit evi-
dence illegally obtained. State v. Addy, 210 S. C. 353, 42 S. E. 2d
585 (1947) ; State v. Cook, 204 S. C. 295, 28 S. E. 2d 842 (1944) ;
State v. Kanellos, 122 S. C. 351, 115 S. E. 636 (1923); contra,
Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S. C. 146, 88 S. E. 441, L. R. A. 1916 E
714 (1916), discussed infra. Michigan is one of 21 states that fol-
lows the exclusionary rule. Under this rule if it would be unreason-
able for a government officer to obtain entrance to a man's premises
by force, or by an illegal threat or show of force, and then to search
for and seize his private papers, it is impossible to contend that a
like search and seizure would be reasonable if admission to the prem-
ises was obtained by stealth. Gouled v. United States, supra; People
v. Wilson, 145 Cal. App. 2d 1, 301 P. 2d 974 (1956). It is neces-
sary that officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, be
put under limitations and restraints in order to secure the people,
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against all unreasonable
1959]
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searches and seizures under the guise of law. Weeks v. United
States, supra; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.
385 (1920). The necessity for such limitations and restraints has
resulted in the requirement that, in most instances, warrants based
upon probable cause must be issued before searches and seizures may
be undertaken. People ex rel. Clapp v. Listinan, 84 App. Div. 637,
82 N. Y. Supp. 784 (1903) ; State v. Williams, 45 Ore. 314, 77 Pac.
965,67 L. R. A. 166 (1904). If such a requirement is to obviate the
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures and enforced con-
fessions, then it follows that the warrant must be valid and follow
lawful procedure before it can become an agency of lawful entry.
Weeks v. United States, supra; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
616 (1885). The character of the subject of the search does not
affect the question of what procedure conforms to the conditions
prescribed by the Constitution upon which warrants for search and
seizure issue. People v. Marxhausen, supra. This protection reaches
all alike, whether accused of crime or not. Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U. S. 480, (1958); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S.
493, (1958); Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346, (1958);
Weeks v. United States, supra. In order for a warrant to be valid,
the purpose for its procurement must coincide with the reason for its
issue. If a warrant ostensibly obtained for one purpose is in reality
procured to achieve a different result, then it is invalid as to the
different result. Gouled v. United States, supra; People v. Wilson,
supra. Thus, a search is unreasonable and unlawful where the war-
rants purportedly to be served were obtained as a subterfuge for gain-
ing entrance to the premises and without the intent of making the
specific arrests for which they called. Gouled v. United States, supra;
People v. Wilson, supra.
Should evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search and
seizure be admissible in a criminal prosecution of those persons to-
vrards whom it was unlawful? The authorities who support admis-
sion feel that the fact that it was obtained by means of an unlawful
search and seizure should not reward the criminal and set him free
to prey on society again. A Symposium on Law and Police Practice,
52 NoRTrHwtS ziiN L. Riv. 46 (1957); 8 WIGMORt, EVInMNc4,
§§ 2183-2184 b (1940). Other authorities who prefer exclusion
feel that this is the only effective method of restraining overzealous
police officials. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905, 50
A. L. R. 2d 513 (1955); 52 NORTHWSTRMN L. Rv. at 72 (1957);
Assoc. of American Law Schools, SELECTED WRITINGS ON EVIDENC
Vol. 1i
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AND TRIAL, pp. 303-304 (1957) (generally); Chafee, 35 HARVARD
L. Rzv. 673 (1922). While in the great majority of cases, South
Carolina has followed the common-law rule of admissibility, in the
case of Blacksburg v. Beam, supra, the South Carolina Supreme
Court stated the following:
It is fundamental that a citizen may not be arrested and have
his person searched by force and without process in order to
secure testimony against him. . . . It is better that the guilty
shall escape, rather than another offense shall be committed in
the proof of guilt.
In so far as this case holds that the evidence obtained by an unlaw-
ful search is inadmissible, it is opposed to the great weight of au-
thority. However, the case has never been expressly overruled or
distinguished from the other South Carolina cases. The fact that
the Supreme Court has a precedent in accord with the exclusionary
rule assumes greater significance in view of the trend which is to-
ward the exclusionary rule. A moderate approach to the question
of admissibility would seem most satisfactory. While it may be
argued that an unlawful arrest should not entitle a citizen to an acquit-
tal from an offense which he committed, it is equally arguable that
only where unlawfully acting officers know that the prosecution
cannot profit from a wrongful search and seizure will unreasonable
police practices be curbed. The courts should treat the question of
admissibility on a case by case basis. After weighing the relative
merits of both interests, the court should either allow the evidence
or reject it as would best serve the ends of justice. However, the
efforts of the courts to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy
as they are, should not be allowed to override the great principle of
constitutional protection of individual liberty. Thus there would be
a presumption that illegally obtained evidence should not be admitted
in a criminal prosecution. This presumption would be rebuttable
only by a showing to the satisfaction of the court that the public
interest in conviction was sufficiently strong to outweigh the rights
of the individual. It is only where the court is clearly convinced
that the better interests of society are to be served, that illegally ob-
tained evidence should be allowed in the prosecution of an accused.
HARRY M. LIGHTSiY, JR.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - Divorce - Motion to Reopen De.
fault Divorce Judgment Denied Where Plaintiff Remarried. - De-
fendant wife suffered a judgment by default in a divorce proceeding
1959]
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and made a motion to vacate the decree on the ground of excusable
neglect. Defendant made this motion almost six months subsequent
to the time that her attorneys learned of the decree. Plaintiff husband
remarried five months after the decree of divorce was filed and was
living with his second wife when the motion to vacate was made.
The trial court denied motion to vacate the judgment and defendant
appeals. HELD: It is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate
a default judgment where the explanation of the delay in making
the motion to vacate is not satisfactory, and the rights of an innocent
third person have been placed in jeopardy during the delay. Grant
v. Grant, 233 S. C. 433, 105 S. E. 2d 523 (1958).
Vacation of judgments is a power conceded by common law to
all the courts. Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 130, 79 Am. Dec. 681 (1861) ;
Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N. Y. 325, 19 N. E. 842, 8 Am. St. Rep.
748 (1899). In most jurisdictions statutes have been enacted au-
thorizing the courts to vacate or set aside judgments rendered against
a litigant through his surprise, mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, e. g. CoDe oP LAws oV SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1213.
These statutes have been held to embrace default judgments in di-
vorce proceedings. Stevens v. Stevens, 253 Ala. 315, 45 So. 2d 153
(1950) ; Chambers v. Chambers, 206 Ga. 796, 58 S. E. 2d 814 (1950),
aff'd, 207 Ga. 582, 63 S. E. 2d 359 (1951); Brock v. Brock, 225
S. C. 261, 81 S. E. 2d 898 (1954). Notwithstanding the existence
of the power to vacate, there is a manifest reluctance to disturb a
final judgment of divorce, Maker v. Title Guarantee & 7'. Co., 95
Ill. App. 363, 157 A. L. R. 25 (1901) ; Bussey v. Bussey, 95 N. H.
349, 64 A. 2d 4, 12 A. L. R. 2d 151 (1949), and the power to so
vacate should be exercised with great caution. Bussey v. Bussey,
supra; Nichells v. Nichells, 5 N. D. 125, 64 N. W. 73, 33 L. R. A.
515 (1895). The motion to vacate should not be granted unless
there is a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense. Zani v.
Zani, 325 Mass. 134, 89 N. E. 2d 342 (1949); Savage v. Cannon,
204 S. C. 473, 30 S. E. 2d 70 (1944); McKay, Survey of South
Carolina Law: Practice and Procedure, 9 S. C. L. g. 91, 97 (1956).
On the other hand, some courts are inclined to the view that a default
decree of divorce will be set aside more readily than default judg-
ments in other actions, their reasons being to preserve the marital
status of the persons involved and to prevent fraud. Smith v. Sinith,
64 Cal. App. 2d 415, 148 P. 2d 868 (1944); Poxwell v. Foxwell,
122 Md. 263, 89 AtI. 494 (1914). It is almost universally held that
the remarriage of the spouse who obtained a divorce is not of itself
a sufficient reason for denying relief to the other spouse, Swift v.
[Vol, 11
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Swift, 239 Iowa 62, 29 N. W. 2d 535 (1947); Taylor v. Taylor,
159 Va. 338, 165 S. E. 414 (1932), especially where the second
marriage was a hasty one. Nichells v. Nichells, 5 N. D. 125, 64
N. W. 73, 33 L. R. A. 515 (1895) ; Taylor v. Taylor, supra. How-
ever, at least one jurisdiction, Kentucky, holds that the court cannot
vacate a divorce, even during the term in which the judgment was
entered, if either party had remarried, unless there was fraud in in-
voking the court to grant the divorce. Sheffer v. Speckman, 305 Ky.
627, 205 S. W. 2d 305 (1947) ; Moran v. Moran, 281 Ky. 739, 137
S. W. 2d 418 (1940) ; Newcomb v. Newcomb, 13 Bush 544, 26 Am.
Rep. 222 (Ky. 1877). The court should manifest reluctance to
vacate a judgment of divorce where a second marriage has occurred,
State v. Watson, 179 U. S. 679 (1898); Swift v. Swift, 239 Iowa
62, 29 N. W. 2d 535 (1947), and the court should carefully ascertain
whether laches affects the right to relief. Brockman v. Brockmnan,
133 Minn. 148, 157 N. W. 1086 (1916) ; Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa.
256, 198 Atl. 154 (1938). If the defendant sought to have the
judgment vacated with reasonable diligence after discovering the
existence of the default decree, he is not guilty of laches even if the
other party has remarried. Rivieccio v. Bothan, 27 Cal. 2d 621, 165
P. 2d 677 (1946) (six year delay; one child born from second mar-
riage) ; Williams v. Williams, 57 Cal. App. 36, 206 Pac. 650" (1922).
A diligent weighing of the evidence is required where there is issue
or possible issue from the second marriage, Swift v. Swift, 239 Iowa
62, 29 N. W. 2d 535 (1947) ; Bussey v. Bussey, 95 N. H. 349, 64
A. 2d 4, 12 A. L. R. 2d 151 (1949), but the procreation of children
in the second marriage does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle
to vacating the judgment in equity. Newcomb v. Newcomb, 13
Bush 544, 26 Am. Rep. 222 (Ky. 1877) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 159 Va.
338, 165 S. E. 414 (1932) (eighteen year delay; five children born
from the second marriage). Where the second marriage occurs be-
fore the first wife learns of the default judgment, a delay in asking
that the judgment be vacated would not be grounds for denial, as
the delay would not be the cause of the second wife's unfortunate
situation. Caswell v. Caswell, 120 Ill. 377, 11 N. E. 342 (1887)
(fourteen year delay) ; Leathers v. Stewart, 108 Me. 96, 79 At. 16
(1911) (fifteen year delay). The question whether the court ought
to set aside a default divorce decree after the remarriage of one of
the parties rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, Johnson
v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 686, 185 P. 2d 49 (1947), whose ruling
thercon will not be disturbed unless abuse of the discretion is clearly
shown, Miller v. Miller, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 280, 91 N. E. 2d 804
1959]
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(1949), which is the same rule applied in other cases of default
judgments. E. g., Pruit:e v. Burns, 212 S. C. 325, 47 S. E. 2d 785
(1948) ; Savage v. Cannon, 204 S. C. 473, 30 S. E. 2d 70 (1944).
The point of law in this case is not new. Courts have held before
that a default divorce decree will be upheld where the rights of an
innocent third party have intervened, and the party making the
motion to vacate is guilty of unsatisfactorily explained laches. How-
ever, two statements of the Court here prove to be unique. Where it
was said, "She had every right to assume that plaintiff had been
lawfully divorced. An examination of the record in the Clerk's
office would have disclosed no defect," the Court seemed to draw
an analogy between the second wife and a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice seeking shelter behind the Recording Statute.
Whether or not a second wife and even children by the second wife
are proper or necessary parties to the proceeding is a question not
raised or involved in this case but which will need to be answered
in the future. ANNOT., 12 A. L. R. 2d 171 (1950). The decision
of a case in this area of the law necessarily depends on the facts in
that particular case, and the decision is rightly subjected to the sound
discretion of the court. Any jurisdiction which tries to predict the
outcome of the law in this field or which tries to lay down concrete
rules pertaining to the vacating of default judgments in divorce
proceedings is doomed to failure.
ARTHUR LEE GASTON.
LANDLORD AND TENANT - Condemnation of Leasehold -
Landlord's Right to Rent Accruing Subsequent Thereto. - The
major portion of the leasehold was condemned so as to make the
remainder untenantable. The lessee surrendered possession to the con-
demnor, and the lessor sued the lessee for rent accruing subsequent
to the surrender but prior to the time the lease was to terminate.
The trial court gave judgment for the defendant and plaintiff ap-
peals. HELD: Affirmed. Condemnation of the major portion of
the premises so as to make the remainder untenantable terminates
the lease and the lessee's obligation to pay the rent. Farr v. Williams,
232 S. C. 208, 101 S. E. 2d 483 (1957).
All private parties including the owner hold their land subject to
the sovereign's inherent power of eminent domain. U. S. v. Jones,
109 U. S. 513 (1883) ; Marin County Water Co. v. Marin County,
145 Cal. 586, 79 P. 282 (1904) ; Stark v. McGowan, 1 Nott & McC.
387, 9 Am. Dec. 712 (S. C. 1818). There is a constitutional right to
[Vol. 11
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"just compensation" when a private owner's land is taken for public
use, Phelps v. U. S., 274 U. S. 341 (1927); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Eshelman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 P. 1119, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 652,
Ann. Cas. 1915C 822 (1913), and a tenant is an "owner" in the con-
stitutional sense and entitled to share in the compensation to the
extent of his interest if the land is taken during the term of the
lease. A. W. Duckett Co. v. U. S., 266 U. S. 149 (1924) ; Pasadena
v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 257 P. 526, 53 A. L. R. 679 (1927); Cor-
rigan v. Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N. E. 746, 21 L. R. A. 212 (1893).
Taking of the demised premises by the sovereign under the power
of eminent domain is not a technical eviction; Corrigan v. Chicago,
supra; Schmid v. Thorsen, 89 Or. 575, 170 P. 930 (1918) ; therefore,
the lessee has no action against the lessor for breach of a covenant
of quiet enjoyment. Hinnicks v. New Orleans, 50 La. Ann. 1214, 24
So. 224 (1898) ; Fros! v. Earnest, 4 Whart. 86 (Pa. 1839) ; Parks
v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198 (Mass. 1834). The divesting of title under
power of eminent domain is more related to a taking by paramount
title, Corrigan v. Chicago, supra; where the obligation of the lessee to
pay the rent is extinguished. Morse v. Goddard, 13 Metc. 177, 46 Am.
Dec. 728 (Mass. 1847) ; Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368, 61 Am. Dec.
364 (1855). If the premises are taken in their entirety, the title
of both lessor and lessee is extinguished, Corrigan v. Chicago, supra;
Lodge v. Columbia Packing Co., 162 F. Supp. 483 (D. Mass. 1958),
but this is not true if the entire premises are taken by the state for
a temporary period not to extend beyond the termination of the
lease. Carlstrom v. Lyon Van & Storage Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d
625, 313 P. 2d 645 (1957); Leonard v. Autocar Sales & Service
Co., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N. E. 2d 477, 163 A. L. R. 679 (1945). In ab-
sence of statute, a lease may be made for any period of time which the
parties select, U. S. v. Shea, 152 U. S. 178 (1894) ; Monbar, Inc. v.
Monaghan, 18 Del. Ch. 395, 162 Atl. 50 (1932) ; Columbia Rwy., Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Jones, 119 S. C. 480, 112 S. E. 267 (1921), and a
contingent limitation of the term is valid and enforceable. Stewart
7,. Pier, 58 Iowa 15, 11 N. W. 711 (1882) ; In re Savin Hill Yacht
Club Assoc., 246 Mass. 75, 140 N. E. 299 (1923); 3 TiioNrrSON,
REAL PROPERTY § 1178 (2d Ed. 1939). The terms of the lease may
provide that the tenant's liability for rent will cease when the title
to the whole of the premises passes to the condemnor, United Cigar
Stores of America v. Norwood, 124 Misc. 488, 208 N. Y. S. 420
(1925); Levine v. Horwitz, 373 Pa. 277, 95 A. 2d 540 (1953), or
that the tenant will not be relieved of liability until he is actually
evicted. Phyfe v. Eimer, 45 N. Y. 102 (1871); Goldstein v. St'ad-
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ler's Shoes, Inc., 159 Misc. 804, 288 N. Y. S. 793 (1936) ; Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Hayden, 20 R. I. 544, 40 Atl. 421
(1898). In the absence of statute or terms in the lease, the cases
are undecided as to when the lessee's liability for the rent terminates,
with some of the cases saying (often contrary to prior rules of their
own jurisdiction) that in order for the lessee to remain liable the
premises must remain tenantable. Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md.
621, 61 At. 203, 4 Ann. Cas. 1005 (1905) ; Yellow Cab Co. v. Staf-
ford-Smith Co., 320 Ill. 294, 150 N. E. 670, 43 A. L. R. 1173
(1926); Yellow Cab Co. v. Howard, 243 Ill. App. 263 (1927).
Other cases say that passage of title to the condemnor rather than
suitability for occupation is the test. Leonard v. Autocar Sales &
Service Co., supra; Lodge v. Columbia Packing Co., supra. The
common law rule, when the entire leasehold is condemned, is that
the lease is terminated and the tenant's liability for the rent ceases.
Corrigan v. Chicago, supra; Lodge v. Columbia Packing Co., supra;
Levine v. Horwitz, supra; 32 Amt. Jur., Landlord and Tenant § 491
(1941); 52 C. J. S., Landlord and Tenant § 483 (1947). Con.ra:
Foote v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio 408, 38 Am. Dec. 737 (1842). If only
a portion of the premises are taken, the majority rule is that the
lessee is not relieved of his liability for the rent, Pasadena v. Porter,
supra; Stubbings v. Evanston, 136 Ill. 37, 26 N. E. 577, 29 Am. St.
Rep. 300, 11 L. R. A. 839 (1891); Dyer v. Wightman, 66 Pa.
425 (1870), nor is the lessee entitled to have the rent apportioned
or abated. Gluck v. Baltimore, 81 Md. 315, 32 Atl. 515, 48 Am.
St. Rep. 515 (1895). (But Compare: Baltimore v. Latrobe, supra);
Stubbings v. Evanston, supra; McDonald Co. v. Hawkins, 287 Mass.
71, 191 N. E. 405 (1934). However, there is limited authority to
the effect that if only a portion of the leasehold is condemned, the
rent will be apportioned pro tanto. Levee Coners. v. Johnson, 66
Miss. 248, 6 So. 199 (1889); Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597
(1856) ; Uhler v. Cowan, 192 Pa. 443, 44 Atl. 42 (1899). (But Coin-
pare: Dyerv. Wightman, supra; ANNoTs.) 43 A. L. R. 1173 (1926);
53 A. L. R. 686 (1928) ; 163 A. L. R. 679 (1946).
In the case under discussion, the Court quotes from Onir0, VALU-
ATION UNDER EMIN T DOMAIN § 121 (2d. Ed. 1953) at p. 521:
"At common law the prevailing rule, when the entire premises have
been condemned or when they have been rendered ientenantable by the
taking of a part, is that the lessee's obligation to pay the rent ceases".
(emphasis added). According to the great weight of authority, the
taking of a part only does not affect the lessee's liability for the
rent. However, the Court proceeds to quote the majority rule as
[Vol. 11
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stated in Corrigan v. Chicago: "Where the entire tract of land or lot
is taken the effect is to abrogate the relation of landlord and tenant".
(emphasis added). This latter statement was not applicable to the
principal case, which was concerned with the taking of a portion
only. To add to the confusion, after determining that the case was
not controlled by statute or terms of the lease, the Court said: "We
must have recourse, then, to the common law rule in such cases,
under which the lease is deemed terminated and with it the lessee's
obligation to pay further rent." (232 S. C. at 213). The result of
all this seems to be that the Court was misled by the quotation from
Orgel. Thus, the question arises as to what rule will be applied in
future cases - the true common law rule, or the rule of the present
case? Furthermore, what rule will be applied to cases where a
portion only is taken but the premises remain tenantable? Since
the lessee's liability for rent completely terminates when the premises
are only partially taken but the remainder left wholly untenantable,
it seems reasonable that he should be entitled to an apportionment of
the rent if a portion is taken but the remainder is left untenantable.
If the Court should so hold, this would again place it in the minority,
for although the Court states that they are adopting the common law
rule, the decision, under the facts of the case, clearly falls under the
minority rule. The better rule would be that the lessee is relieved of
liability only in the case of a taking of the entire premises. If less
than that, the lessee should look to the condemnation proceedings
for his compensation. If these rules were followed, the question
of what portion of the premises must be condemned before the
lessee is relieved of liability would be avoided.
D. KENNETH BAKER.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Conduct of Trial - Note-
taldng by Jurors. - Defendant was convicted of murder and appealed
on three grounds, one of them being that the court erred in refusing
a motion for new trial predicated on the fact that two of the jurors
had taken notes of the testimony and charge. No evidence was pre-
sented as to the extent of this note taking, but the trial judge, the
solicitor, and one of the attorneys for the defendant all conceded
that they had observed this during the course of the trial. However,
counsel for defendant said that he did not observe such during the
charge. HELD: Affirmed. Even if note taking by a juror is un-
lawful, defendant's counsel waived any objection thereto by not
raising it at trial. However, subject to the discretion of the trial
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judge, jurors have the right to take notes on their own initiative
without prior permission to do so. State v. Trent, 234 S. C. 26, 106
S. E. 2d 527 (1959).
The question as to a juror's right to take notes has arisen under
three factual situations: Where he takes notes (1) on his own initia-
tive, without prior authorization of the court to do so, or (2) with
the court's permission after counsel has moved to allow such, or (3)
at the trial judge's suggestion given without any request therefor
by counsel. It is generally held to be proper for jurors to take notes
on the proceedings, either without prior authorization, e. g., Denson
v. Stanley, 17 Ala. App. 198, 84 So. 770 (1919), or with authoriza-
tion granted by the court upon motion of counsel, e. g., Cahill v.
Baltimore, 129 Md. 17, 98 Atl. 235 (1916). Other courts have held
it to be a matter within the discretion of the trial court, particularly
in those cases which would not work prejudice to either party. State
v. Keehn, 85 Kan. 765, 118 Pac. 851 (1911); Miller v. Common-
wealth, 175 ICy. 241, 194 S. W. 320 (1917). Particular circum-
stances in a case might even make such note taking desirable. Omaha
Fire Insurance Co. v. Crighton, 50 Neb. 314, 69 N. W. 766 (1897)
(jury permitted to list an extensive number of articles alleged to
have been destroyed in a fire); Gasparovic v. Reed, 5 Pa. D. & C.
531 (1922) (note taking allowed in a personal injury action on
amounts plaintiff had to expend for various medical treatments).
On the other hand, despite these cases allowing note taking either
without authority or upon motion of counsel, it was held to be pre-
judicially erroneous when, over objection of the litigants, the trial
judge on his own initiative told the jurors they might take notes.
Corbin v. City of Cleveland, 144 Ohio St. 32, 56 N. E. 2d 214, 154
A. L. R. 874 (1944). Note taking during criminal actions is now
permitted by statute in nine states, a list of which may be found
in United States v. Campbell, 138 F. Supp. 344 (N. D. Iowa 1956).
Some few cases have found such note taking to be inherently im-
proper and that no error was committed by the trial court in sup-
pressing it. In United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457 (6th Cir. 1900),
aff'd 107 Fed. 753 (6th Cir. 1901), the court said that it gave the
juror who took notes on the proceedings an undue influence in dis-
cussing the cases with other jurors who relied on their memory. It
was further pointed out that without ill purpose they might be inac-
curate and deficient, and that with corrupt motivation they might
become instruments of deceit. Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492 (1871)
pointed out that counsel might use the device of note taking to divert
the attention of the jurors. It was stated in Corbin v. City of Cleve-
[Vol. 11
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land, supra, that permission to take notes might easily be interpreted
by the jurors as part of their duty, even though they might lack
ability to do so adequately. The argument that such note taking
might supply written evidence to impeach the jury's verdict and
might thereby tend to destroy the sanctity surrounding the jury de-
liberations was advanced in Gasparovic v. Reed, supra, but was re-
jected. However, in cases where the action of the juror in taking
the notes was held to be reasonably discoverable by the appellant,
failure to object during the trial was held to constitute a waiver,
even though the act may have been in error. Swift & Co. v. Bleise,
63 Neb. 739, 89 N. W. 310 (1902) ; Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189
Mass. 457, 76 N. E. 127 (1905).
The question of whether jury members should be allowed to take
notes during trial proceedings presents a dilemma, both horns of
which seem based on possibilities rather than certainties. In some
instances such note taking might clearly work prejudice and heighten
the possibilities of error. In others, some form of memorandum
could presumably become a necessity so that jurors might base their
verdict on all the facts rather than on partial recollections. There
is no rule which could group certain types of cases firmly within
either category. Clearly, then, if such note taking is to properly
be allowed or denied, it must be a question of discretion. The trial
judge is in the best position to exercise this choice. A partial dissent
in this case agreed that such note taking was clearly a matter of the
trial judge's discretion, but stated that under no circumstances should
it be allowed on the charge. By its nature, a mistake by the juror
with regard to the charge might wreak greater havoc than a mistake
with regard to a certain fact. But any such difference would seem
one of degree and not of kind. Therefore, again it would seem to
be a question of discretion - discretion as to the entire proceeding
and not merely portions of it.
WIlIAm BANKs LoNG, JR.
RELEASES - Joint Tort-Feasors - Release of One Joint Tort-
Feasor Held Not to Release Others Unless So Intended. - The plain-
tiff Real Estate Broker sued a purchaser for commissions lost as
alleged result of conspiracy between the vendor and the purchaser.
In a prior action the broker had sued the vendor and after extensive
litigation the broker had settled with the vendor for a portion of his
commission. The vendor was released by the broker. The broker
now sues the purchaser for the rest of his commission and alleges
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that the purchaser and the vendor conspired in excluding the broker
from his lawful commission. The purchaser's main contention is
that the release of the vendor in the prior action automatically re-
leased him and therefore this action is barred. The trial court held
for the purchaser and dismissed the broker's complaint. The appel-
late court reversed. On appeal, the Supreme Court, HELD: Af-
firmed. The release of one joint tort-feasor does not release others
unless so intended. Breen v. Peck, 28 N. J. 351, 146 A. 2d 665 (1958).
Under the English common law, the rule is that the release of
one joint tort-feasor operates as an automatic release of all others.
Cocke v. Jennor, Hobart 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K. B. 1614) ; accord,
Tompkins v. Clay St. Hill R. Co., 66 Cal. 163, 4 Pac. 1165 (1884).
This is the prevailing view in most American courts today. 76
C. J. S., Releases § 50, p. 681 (1952); Braswell v. Morrow, 195
N. C. 127, 141 S. E. 489 (1928) ; McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co.,
40 F. Supp. 11 (W. D. S. C. 1941); Parker v. Bissonette, 203 S. C.
155, 163, 26 S. E. 2d 497 (1943) (common law rule apparently
recognized). However, this English release rule has been under
vigorous attack in the United States for many years. See Wigmore,
Release to One Joint Tort-feasor, 17 ILL. L. Rxv. 563 (1923). Some
courts have gotten around this rule by construing the release as a
covenant not to sue. Duck v. Mayeu, 2 Q. B. 511 (1892); Judson
v. People's Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N. J. 67, 110 A. 2d
24 (1954). To determine the nature of the instrument it is neces-
sary to look at its terms. Rector v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 102 F.
Supp. 263 (S. D. Cal. 1952). The courts all agree, however, that
if the consideration paid by one tort-feasor for the release is full
satisfaction for the injury, the other tort-feasors are discharged.
Pitkin v. Chapman, 121 Misc. 88, 200 N. Y. Supp. 235 (1923);
Slade v. Sherrod, 175 N. C. 346, 95 S. E. 557, 50 A. L. R. 1060
(1918). Also most courts hold that if the settlement was not for the
whole injury, the remaining joint tort-feasors may show the sum
received from the other joint tort-feasor as a satisfaction pro tanto.
Louisville Gas and Electric Co. v. Beaucond, 188 Ky. 725, 224 S. W.
179 (1920); accord, McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., supra. In a
number of states the common law release rule has been enunciated,
changed, or replaced by statutes. Hosler v. Ireland, 219 Fed. 489
(C. C. A. Cal. 1915); Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P. 2d 740
(1932). Many jurisdictions hold that it is not material whether the
instrument be considered a release or a covenant not to sue, if the
agreement expressly reserves the plaintiff's rights against the other
joint tort-feasor. MeKenna v. Austin 134 F. 2d 659, 148 A. L. R.
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1253 (D. C. Cir. 1943); also see PRosszi , ToRTs 246 (2nd Ed.
1955); 1ZSTAzE zNN, ToRTs § 885, comment b (1939). Other
courts hold that it is the right of an injured party to accept satisfaction
in part from one joint tort-feasor, release him, and proceed against
the others; the express reservation of this right is not necessary and
the release need not take the form of a covenant not to sue, Steen-
huis v. Holland, 217 Ala. 105, 115 So. 2 (1927); Louisville and
Evansville Mail Co. v. Barn's Adv'r., 117 Ky. 860, 79 S. W. 261
(1904), the view being that the essential question is whether the
plaintiff's claim has been satisfied in full; and this is dearly a matter
of intent of the parties. See 24 So. CAL. L. Rv. 466 (1951). Thus,
there is a respectable minority of authority to the effect that re-
leasing one joint tort-feasor does not necessarily release the others
unless this was the intent of the parties. Gronquist v. Olson, 242
Minn. 119, 64 N. W. 2d 159 (1954) ; Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256,
292 P. 577 (1930); Daily v. Somberg, 28 N. J. 372, 146 A. 2d 676
(1958).
Under the theory of the essential unity of the injury in the early
common law, the whole cause of action was discharged upon the
release of one joint tort-feasor. It was accordingly held that the
release of one joint tort-feasor released all. At once this old, arbi-
trary rule seems most unreasonable. It is often used as a trap for
the unwary. The injured party is sometimes taken advantage of
by giving, in good faith, a release to one joint tort-feasor, not know-
ing that it will also release the other tort-feasors, at the insistence of
a shrewd defendant who connives to help his co-tort-feasor. The
common law rule would operate unjustly in this situation. The
common law rule should be overturned at every opportunity by the
courts, as it was in the instant case. Perhaps even legislation would
be in order to change the law in this respect. Rather than quibbling
about unity of injury in regard to releases, the essential question
should be whether the plaintiff's claim has been satisfied, and this
is a matter of intent of the parties. This intent should be determined
by the language used in the instrument, the amount paid for the re-
lease, and the surrounding circumstances.
JAMZ5s Z. HowY.
TORTS - Insurance - Insurance Company Has Duty To Use
Reasonable Care To Ascertain Insurable Interest. - Mrs. Earle Den-
nison procured three life insurance policies on her two-year-old niece-
in-law (daughter of her deceased husband's sister) from defendant
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insurance companies. In order to collect the insurance, Mrs. Den-
nison murdered the child. For this crime she was tried, convicted,
and executed. Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424,66 So. 2d 552 (1953).
The plaintiff, father of the child, sued the defendant insurance com-
panies under the wrongful death statute, Ala. Code tit. 7, § 119
(1940), on the theory that the death resulted from the wrongful acts
of the defendants in issuing policies on the life of the child to one
who did not have an insurable interest in the life. The lower court
submitted the question of negligence to the jury, resulting in a verdict
for plaintiff and judgment entered for $75,000. On appeal, HELD:
Affirmed. An insurance company is under a duty to use reasonable
care not to issue a policy of life insurance in favor of a beneficiary
who has no interest in the continuation of the life of the insured.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696,
61 A. L. R. 2d 1346 (1957).
The English "Gaming" statute, passed in 1774, made all insurance
policies issued to a beneficiary without insurable interest null and
void. 14 Geo. III, c. 48 (1774). There is a dispute as to the effect
of this statute on the common law. 1 COOLEY, B iEs ON INSURANCE
§ 1(a), Chap. III (1st ed. 1905). Some cases say that prior to the
statute, an insurable interest in the life. of the insured was not re-
quired. Vivar v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 52 N. J. L.
455, 20 At. 36 (1890); Hurd v. Doty, 86 Wis. 1, 56 N. W. 371
(1893). Other cases say that the statute was merely declaratory of
the common law. Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115, 7 Am. Dec. 381
(1815); Ritter v. Smith, 70 Md. 261, 16 Atl. 890 (1889). In any
event, it is settled law today that an insurable interest is required in
life insurance to prevent a policy taken by one person on the life
of another from being unenforceable and void. Helmetag's Adminis-
trator v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183, 52 Am. Rep. 316 (1884) ; Henderson v.
Life Insurance Co. of Va., 176 S. C. 100, 179 S. E. 680 (1932).
Some states require an insurable interest by statute. VANCE, INSUR-
ANCE § 31 (3rd ed. 1951); PA. SrAT. ANN., tit. 40 § 512 (1954).
Other states have adopted the rule as part of their common law.
Lord v. Dall, supra; Crosswell v. The Conn. Idemnity Ass'n, 51 S. C.
103, 28 S. E. 200 (1897). What amounts to an insurable interest
has been a problem to the courts. Perhaps a complete definition has
yet to be devised, but the following language by Justice Field seems
to have been adopted as the test: "[It is] such interest, arising from
the relations of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of
or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to
him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit
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from the continuance of his life.' Warnok v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775
(1882). It is generally recognized that close relationships, such as
parent and child, brother and sister, and grandparent and grandchild,
standing alone, are sufficient to provide an insurable interest. VANc",
INSURANca § 31 (3rd ed. 1951); Holloman v. Life Ins. Co., 192
S. C. 454, 7 S. E. 2d 169 (1940) (son took out policy on his mother
without her consent). Remote relationships, such as niece and aunt,
standing alone, do not create an insurable interest. Einore v. Life
Ins. Co., 187 S. C. 504, 198 S. E. 5 (1938) (policy on aunt by
nephew held insufficient interest); Wharton v. Home Security Life
Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 254, 173 S. E. 338 (1934). A fortiori, it is uni-
versally held that one cannot procure valid insurance on the life of
another based only on a relation by marriage, i. e., in-laws. VANCe,
INSURANCZ § 31 (3rd ed. 1951); Chandler v. Mut. Life and In-
dustrial Ass/n, 131 Ga. 82, 61 S. E. 1036 (1908). Policies issued
where an insurable interest does not exist are said to be "wagering"
contracts and void as against public policy, the theory being that
they violate the law prohibiting wagering or gaming. Common-
wealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910 (1947) ;
Moseley v. American Nat'l. Ins. Co., 167 S. C. 112, 166 S. E. 94
(1932). Another reason the courts give in explaining the rule re-
quiring insurable interest is that insurance without such interest
offers a temptation to the beneficiary to murder the insured. Nat'l
Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Ball, 157 Miss. 163, 127 So. 268
(1930) ; Henderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 176 S. C. 100, 179 S. E.
680 (1932). It is said that the rule exists not to protect the insurance
companies, but to protect human life. Henderson v. Life Ins. Co.,
of Va., supra; Brockway v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 9 Fed.
244 (W. E. Pa. 1881). Applying the rule to the protection of chil-
dren, some courts have said that the law is especially careful to pro-
tect helpless children from the dangers imposed by insurance without
insurable interest. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 15 Ind. App. 247,
43 N. E. 1056 (1896) ; Hack v. Metz, 173 S. C. 413, 176 S. E. 314
(1934). In an action for damages brought by plaintiff against de-
fendant insurance company for issuing a policy to her son without
her consent, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Holloman v. Life
Ins. Co., 192 S. C. 454, 7 S. E. 2d 169 (1940) raised the issue as
to whether or not an insurance company might be liable for issuing
a policy to a beneficiary without insurable interest. The Court did
not rule out the possibility of such liability, although the issue of
insurable interest was not presented in the case.
The law for many years has recognized that a policy without insur-
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able interest places the insured in a dangerous situation. Up to the
time of the leading case, the rule making such contracts void had been
a narrow rule in the law of insurance, but there is no reason for such
limitation. The law requires all members of society to use reasonable
care not to create an unreasonable risk. And insurance companies
are held to a higher duty of care than are most other businesses. See
Note, 10 S. C. L. Q. 444, 478 (1958). An insurance policy issued
on a person makes him the subject of a contract without his consent
and tends to invade his right to be left alone. The court correctly
decided that an insurance company has the duty to use reasonable care
in investigating insurable interest.
LowaLL W. Ross.
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